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abstract: i use a stylized scenario—the Big Box retailer Problem—to 
demonstrate that the presence of behavioural interdependence in economic 
markets may result in deficient outcomes that are both stable and supported 
by ongoing participant behaviour. i present a theoretical discussion of social 
dilemmas and use the Big Box retailer Problem to illustrate that these 
characteristics—stability and ongoing support—cannot be reliably employed 
as indicators of outcome efficiency. equally important is the conclusion 
that upfront costs and the ongoing necessity of monitoring and encouraging 
contributory behaviour are not reliable indicators of the relative inefficiency 
of outcomes associated with collective action. Questions are raised regarding 
the ethical responsibilities of business educators and the implications of social 
dilemmas for corporate social responsibility research.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, behavioural interdependence, economic 
markets, market failure, social dilemmas
introduction
The market system is justly described as a social wonder. it is a “global coordinator 
of cooperative performances of at least 2 billion people. . . . [it is] without peer, 
in a class by itself. it is the world’s broadest and most detailed organizer of social 
cooperation” (lindblom, 2001: 41). as Kuttner observes, it is now received wisdom 
that free and unfettered markets “are both the essence of human liberty, and 
the most expedient route to prosperity” (Kuttner, 1997: 3). The conviction that 
uncoordinated economic exchange among individuals will produce collective The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 3
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outcomes that maximize social welfare is not new. as alan Greenspan observes in 
his biography, “our ideas about the efficacy of market competition have remained 
essentially unchanged since the eighteenth-century enlightenment, when they 
first emerged, to a remarkable extent, from the mind of one man, adam smith” 
(Greenspan, 2007: 260). When contemporary economists, for example, extol the 
ability of the market mechanism to deliver productive and allocative efficiency and 
to maximize social surplus (see, for example, Bator, 1957; Walters, 1993), they echo 
smith’s observation that the behaviour of individuals often appears to be guided by 
an “invisible hand” in the promotion of the general welfare (smith, 1776/1976).
a market system can be defined as a “method of social coordination by mutual 
adjustment among participants rather than by a central coordinator” (lindblom, 
2001: 23). a society may ask itself, for example, what resources should be devoted 
to the production of insect repellant, red licorice, or buttons? in many societies 
these types of questions are answered by simply leaving individuals alone to “truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another” and waiting for responses in the form of 
efficient resource allocations to emerge from the apparent chaos (smith, 1776/1976: 
8). There is no need for the process to be centrally coordinated or controlled (i.e. 
there is no need for a central coordinator). as long as supporting customs and 
institutions, such as liberty, property rights, and a medium of exchange, are in 
place, it is assumed that market outcomes, if not perfect, are at least “as good as 
could be expected if somebody took command and figured out what ought to be 
done and had a way to get everybody to do what he [or she] was supposed to do” 
(schelling, 1978: 22).
in certain circumstances, however, faith in the ability of economic markets 
to produce outcomes that are as good as could be expected if centrally directed 
is misplaced. specifically, in exchange situations involving participant 
interdependence, economic markets may produce inferior or deficient outcomes that 
are irrational in the sense that there may be other unrealized outcomes in which 
all participants would be better off (heckathorn, 1996; Kollock, 1998; schelling, 
1978). This paper contributes to the broad literature on business and society by 
demonstrating that in these situations attribution errors often lead to incorrect 
conclusions regarding the relative efficiency of market outcomes. as the Big Box 
retailer problem illustrates, the stability and ongoing individual-level support of 
market outcomes in these situations should not employed as indicators of outcome 
efficiency. equally important is the conclusion that the upfront costs and ongoing 
necessity of monitoring and encouraging contributory behaviour should not be The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 4
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relied on as indicators of the relative inefficiency of outcomes associated with 
collective action.
This paper is divided into three main sections. in the first section, i distinguish 
between market activity and collective action by relying on generally-accepted 
concepts from economics (Greenspan, 2007), economic sociology (e.g. Geary, 2010; 
smelser & swedberg, 1994), and the literature in sociology on collective action 
and social dilemmas (e.g. Brooks & strange, 2011; coleman, 1990; heckathorn, 
1996; Kollock, 1998; sanyal, 2009). in the second section, i introduce a stylized 
scenario—the Big Box retailer Problem—that illustrates key differences between 
economic markets and collective action. This scenario is intentionally set up as a 
“fence” dilemma (see Kollock, 1998) and is used as starting point for a theoretical 
discussion of social dilemmas and their implications for market efficiency and 
welfare maximization.
in the last section, i argue that the counter-intuitive nature of social dilemmas 
complicates the assessment of market outcomes and often leads to incorrect 
conclusions regarding outcome efficiency. counter-intuitive feedback loops further 
complicate the assessment of the relative benefits of market activity and collective 
action. This section concludes with a brief discussion of the relevance of transaction 
cost economics and problems associated with market-based social dilemma 
workarounds. The paper concludes with a number of unanswered questions related 
to the intrinsic value of economic markets, the responsibilities of business educators 
and the intersection of corporate strategy and corporate social responsibility.
economic markets vs. collective action
economic markets
The concept of economic markets is surprisingly difficult to circumscribe (lie, 
1997). for present purposes, i define it as lindblom does as “a method of social 
coordination by mutual adjustment among participants rather than by a central 
coordinator” (2001: 23). The concept of social coordination includes all forms 
of cooperation and is intended to describe the process through which we “curb 
epidemics, advance science, or enjoy the pleasures of play and friendship”—it 
describes, in a nutshell, the process of “helping and being helped” (lindblom, 2001: 
21). only a subset (albeit an important subset) of social coordination is achieved 
through economic markets. mutual adjustment, as defined by lindblom (2001), is The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 5
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the opposite of central coordination. it is a form of behavioural give-and-take in 
which social actors simultaneously (and directly) both adapt to and influence the 
behaviour of other social actors. The feats of coordination accomplished in properly 
functioning economic markets are grounded in ongoing and decentralized mutual 
adjustment processes as individual participants both respond to and influence price 
signals (and other market-based information).
mutual adjustment and absence of a central coordinator distinguish economic 
markets from other social coordination mechanisms. lindblom illustrates these 
concepts by using the example of a group of six men working to launch a boat. 
The owner of the boat might direct the efforts of the other five by issuing orders 
from the comfort of a lawn chair. in this case, the owner would be exercising a 
type of centralized or unilateral control. on the other hand, the six men might 
coordinate their efforts by carefully observing each other and both responding to 
and influencing each others’ actions while they work. in this case, their efforts 
would exhibit decentralized or multilateral control. for present purposes, therefore, 
economic markets are defined as a method of achieving social coordination 
through mutual adjustment characterized by decentralized or multilateral control 
(lindblom, 2001).
considerable intellectual effort has been devoted to fleshing out and describing 
the operational details of economic markets, although the broad outline remains 
remarkably similar to what adam smith sketched more than two hundred years 
ago (Greenspan, 2007). for example, market systems require personal liberty, 
property rights, quid pro quo exchange, the sale of activities and performances, 
intermediaries, entrepreneurs, and the emergence of collectives (lindblom, 2001). 
if markets are to be sufficiently competitive, there should be a large number of 
independent buyers and sellers, no pricing power, product homogeneity, no barriers 
to entry or exit, no artificial restraints on prices, and all participants should have 
complete information (Walters, 1993). if these conditions are met, competitive 
pressures will lead to productive and allocative efficiency, and the maximization of 
social welfare (Bator, 1957, 1958).
collective action
collective action can be defined, simply, as “something people do together” (oliver, 
1993: 276). i define it for present purposes as social-coordination achieved through 
centralized or unilateral control. There is an extensive literature in sociology and The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 6
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related fields that addresses collective action (see, for example, coleman, 1990; 
heckathorn, 1996; oliver, 1993; sanyal, 2009; Tang, 2008).
one of the central issues in collective action research is the nature of the 
relationship between individual interests, shared interests, and subsequent group 
action. Prior to the publication of mancur olson’s influential book, The logic 
of collective action (1965), it was mistakenly assumed by most social scientists 
that there was often an “unproblematic congruence” between individual interests 
and group interests and that group interests and subsequent action were linked in 
a straightforward manner (oliver, 1993:273). Just as individuals were presumed 
to act in their own self-interest, it was assumed that groups of individuals with 
common interests would also act in support of those shared interests. as olson 
explains, “if the members of some group have a common interest or objective, 
and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been 
thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were 
rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective” (olson, 1965: 1). as olson 
demonstrates, however, “self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests” and that the commonly accepted notion that groups will 
act to further their interests is “unjustified, at least when it is based, as it usually 
is, on the (sometimes implicit) assumption that groups act in their self-interest 
because individuals do” (1965: 2). By implication, therefore, the failure of a group 
to act cannot reliably be taken as evidence of the absence of shared interests or as 
an indication that the group might not be better off if they were to act. although 
olson’s analysis has been amended and extended in important ways over the years 
(see, for example, Kollock, 1998; oliver, 1993), his central assertion that the 
relationship between shared interests and group or collective action is problematic 
remains valid.
economic markets vs. collective action
a strict dichotomy that categorizes all economic activity as either market-based 
or collective in nature may not reflect the complexities of economic reality (see, 
for example, hennart, 1993; Perrow, 1986). a focus on these categories as ideal 
types, however, facilitates comparison and contrast (Doty & Glick, 1994). outcomes 
derived from economic markets emerge organically from self-interested individual 
exchange. There is no attempt to constrain, direct, or influence individual activity 
so that it contributes to desired outcomes once the necessary institutional supports 
and “rules of the game” have been established (friedman, 1970). in properly The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 7
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functioning economic markets, there is no central coordinator, although the social 
benefits derived from market activity (i.e. productive and allocative efficiency, 
maximization of social surplus) may lead an observer to conclude that it appears 
as though there is. collective action, in contrast, involves the articulation of—and 
intentional movement toward—a specific collective outcome. collective goals—or 
group objectives—are elevated above individual interests and individual behaviour 
is often constrained, directed, and/or influenced with the explicit intention of 
channeling it towards desired outcomes. in the case of collective action, unilateral 
control is exercised by a central coordinator. in the context of the modern 
corporation, collective action is similar to the concept of hierarchical control as 
defined in transaction cost economics (coase, 1937; hennart, 1993; Williamson, 
1985). collective action, as defined here, also applies to coordination in other non-
market contexts, such as the family or household.
The Big Box retailer problem
The Big Box retailer problem is a stylized scenario designed to serve as an example 
of a situation in which rational behaviour by individuals in a market context 
can lead to collectively irrational (or deficient) economic outcomes. Behavioural 
interdependence exists when the actions of individual actors change the incentives 
for other actors in the same interaction context. This creates a moving target, in a 
sense, as individual actors base their behaviour on the anticipated actions of other 
actors that are similarly engaged. The Big Box retailer scenario is utilized to 
anchor a theoretical discussion of social dilemmas and illustrate that the presence 
of these dilemmas can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding market efficiency and 
create deceptive feedback loops that appear to confirm these conclusions. here is the 
scenario:
Welcome to small Town, usa, population 100,000. The town has a central 
commercial district comprised of relatively small shops arranged around a 
small, but quaint, plaza. a big box retailer (Big Box retailer)—a company that 
operates large free-standing “box-like” general merchandise stores—has petitioned 
for permission to build a location on the outskirts of town. The following four 
assumptions delineate the dilemma:
1)  The larger scale and lower overhead of the Big Box retailer will allow it to 
operate on thinner margins than the town’s smaller main-street shops. There 
will, therefore, be some costs savings that will be passed on to the local consumer. 
The precise value of these cost savings is unknown.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 8
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2)  if the Big Box retailer is allowed to build its store, lower prices will induce 
individual residents to shift their retail activity to the Big Box retailer and 
the smaller shops surrounding the town plaza will go out of businesses.
3)  The confluence of economic and social activity in the town’s plaza enhances the 
town’s sense of community and collective identity. These benefits will be lost if 
retail activity shifts to the new Big Box retailer. The townspeople, therefore, 
place some value on restricting economic activity to the town’s plaza, although 
the precise value is unknown.
4)  There are no other significant factors to consider. in other words, present retail 
employees are indifferent about whether they work in the town’s plaza or in the 
new Big Box retailer, the same number of retail employees will be employed 
regardless of the town’s decision, the same percentage of economic profit derived 
from retail activity will be spent and/or reinvested in the locally community, 
etc.
economic markets or collective action?
The first assumption explains the second, and these two assumptions make it clear 
that the town faces an either-or decision—either the town’s retail activity will 
continue to be concentrated in the small shops in the town’s plaza (if the town 
dissuades the Big Box retailer from building a location), or it will shift to the new 
Big Box retailer location (if a new store is built). The third assumption makes it 
clear that the town faces a trade-off—either it can elect to preserve the enhanced 
sense of community and collective identify derived from the small main-street 
shops, or it can reap the benefits of lower retail prices. it cannot do both. The last 
assumption imposes an “all-else-equal” condition.
The town must decide whether or not to grant a permit to the Big Box retailer, and 
in so doing, it will determine important structural characteristics of retail activity 
in the community. how should this decision be made? a market-based approach 
might involve issuing a permit to the Big Box retailer, and then letting individual 
economic actors—the townspeople—“vote” with their dollars. Given that the value 
the townspeople attach to the enhanced sense of community and collective identity 
associated with the existing town’s plaza is difficult to quantify, this option may 
seem particularly attractive because it obviates the need to make this value explicit, 
relying instead on the popularized concept of revealed preference (samuelson, 1938). 
on the other hand, if the value of an enhanced sense of community and collective 
identity is outweighed by the cost savings associated with the Big Box retailer, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 9
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then it could be argued that this preference will also be “revealed” by the shopping 
decisions of the town’s residents (i.e. the townspeople will patronize the Big Box 
retailer and the small shops in the town’s plaza will go out of business).
a collective approach, on the other hand, might involve engaging the townspeople 
in some kind of collective decision-making process, either by electing representatives 
who would deal with the issue on behalf of the townspeople, or through a direct 
referendum, or some other similar process (olson, 1965). in this case, the value 
associated with the enhanced sense of community and collective identity derived 
from the concentration of retail activity in the town’s plaza must be assessed and 
weighed against the potential cost savings associated with the Big Box retailer. in 
other words, if collective action is to yield an efficient outcome (i.e. if the town’s 
elected official and/or administrators are to make the “right” decision), information 
about the benefits of the town’s plaza and potential cost savings from the Big 
Box retailer must be made explicit, centralized, and evaluated. in addition to 
this informational challenge, it can also be assumed that the cost of the collective 
decision-making process itself will be non-trivial, given that the time and effort of 
those involved in the process must be compensated in some way. it should also be 
acknowledged that collective action may require other coordination and compliance 
mechanisms, further increasing the cost (coleman, 1990; heckathorn, 1996; oliver, 
1993).
a market-based approach, therefore, appears to have several advantages over a 
collective action approach. first, by allowing individual townspeople to “vote” 
with their dollars, town residents avoid the difficult task of quantifying and 
communicating the value of the town’s plaza and the value of the potential cost 
savings associated with the Big Box retailer to a central coordinator. These 
processes can instead be outsourced to the invisible hand of the market—and 
the market outcome, it is assumed, will reflect the collective preferences of 
the townspeople (for an interesting discussion of this type of “outsourcing,” see 
ostas, 2001). The costs associated with collecting and centralizing the necessary 
information to allow a central coordinator to make the “right” decision are therefore 
avoided. in addition, it could be argued that a market-based approach may be more 
reliable, in the sense that it will be based on actual behaviour (i.e. where town 
residents choose to shop), rather than on hypothetical value assessments. finally, 
because a market-based approach will result in an emergent outcome that will be 
sustained by self-interested individual behaviour, no additional coordination and/or 
compliance mechanisms will be required.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 10
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The rest of the story
The mayor, after carefully considering available options, convenes a town meeting 
in a nearby football stadium. remarkably, all 100,000 residents attend this meeting, 
and in an unprecedented feat of collective introspection, are able to assign a precise 
monetary value of $100 per resident per year to the enhanced sense of community 
and shared identity each resident derives from the town’s plaza. in addition, the Big 
Box retailer presents the results of a detailed study that demonstrates, to everyone’s 
satisfaction, that each member of the community would experience an annual cost 
savings of $50 per year by patronizing the proposed Big Box retailer location. 
Given this new information, the major immediately calls for a vote on the matter. 
Given that the value of maintaining the town square in its current form is accurate 
($100 per person per year), and potential cost savings associated with the Big Box 
retailer is also accurate ($50 per person per year), it isn’t surprising that the vote is 
100,000 to 0 against the Big Box retailer.
Despite the outcome of the vote, the Big Box retailer continues to petition for 
permission to build the new store. The mayor, annoyed by the Big Box retailer’s 
tenacity, approves the permit for the store, reasoning that given the unambiguous 
support by the townspeople for the town’s plaza, the Big Box retailer will soon go 
out of business. surprisingly, on opening day the store parking lot is full. The Big 
Box retailer exceeds its sales projections for the first year and declares the store a 
success. unfortunately, all the main street shops go out of business and the town’s 
retail economic activity shifts to the Big Box retailer.
more than a year later, the major watches a press conference in which the ceo 
of the Big Box retailer speaks at length about his experience in small Town, usa. 
The ceo recounts attempts by the mayor and other town administrators to prevent 
his company from offering the townspeople a retail alternative to the town’s plaza. 
he notes that once the company’s new store was built and residents had a choice of 
shopping locations, they elected to shop at the Big Box retailer. he cites the full 
parking lot and the long lines on opening day as examples of pent-up demand and 
admonishes other small towns for attempting to prevent his company from building 
stores. “consumer choice,” he concludes, “is as american as apple pie. Give people a 
chance to choose—let them vote with their dollars. That’s what a free market is all 
about. if consumers don’t like our prices or our service, then they won’t shop at our 
stores. it’s as simple as that.” The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 11
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a rational decision?
But is it “as simple as that?” Given the scenario’s assumptions, the decision reached 
through collective action—the town meeting and associated vote—was correct in 
terms of maximizing social welfare. Despite this initial decision, however, when the 
town faced the same decision in a market context, it collectively chose to forgo $10 
million ($100 x 100,000) in value from the town’s plaza in the form of enhanced 
sense of community and shared identity in exchange for $5 million ($50 x 100,000) 
in the form of retail cost savings. Those familiar with the dynamics of collective 
action will recognize that the mayor in the Big Box retailer scenario, by allowing 
the new store to be built, created a classic social dilemma for individual town 
residents (heckathorn, 1996). social dilemmas can be defined as “situations in 
which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. That is, individually 
reasonable behaviour leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off than they 
might have been otherwise” (Kollock, 1998). for those accustomed to the idea 
that economic markets generally yield optimal outcomes, the realization that the 
invisible hand, in this case, leads to “collective irrationality” may be difficult to 
understand.
it may be tempting to argue that the observed outcome (in this case, the collectively 
irrational shift of retail activity in the town to the Big Box retailer) would 
not actually occur if the assumptions regarding individual preferences outlined 
above were accurate. in other words, if the townspeople really placed greater 
value on the benefits derived from the small main-street shops, then they would 
not have responded by shifting their economic activity to the Big Box retailer. 
unfortunately, this line of reasoning is flawed. in actuality, even though the 
townspeople in this example were able to accurately and precisely identify the 
value they placed on the small main-street shops ($100 per resident per year) and 
the lower prices offered by the Big Box retailer ($50 per resident per year), the 
mayor should have been able to foresee that the townspeople, when confronted with 
individual choice in a market context, would collectively “choose” to shop at the 
Big Box retailer—and would therefore make a collectively irrational decision. 
The key in this situation is to recognize that the collective identity derived from 
the confluence of economic and social activity represents a public good (olson, 
1965; samuelson, 1954) and that attempts to provide (or sustain) a public good 
through market activity creates what is often referred to as a “social fence” dilemma 
(Kollock, 1998).The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 12
Beal, Brent D. (2012) ‘competitive markets, collective action, and the Big Box retailer 
problem’, The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
a Primer on social Dilemmas
social dilemmas are interaction situations in which rational individual behaviour 
produces irrational group or collective outcomes. all social dilemmas exhibit at least 
one deficient equilibrium—an equilibrium that is deficient because there exists at 
least one alternative, but unrealized, outcome in which everyone would be better off 
(heckathorn, 1996; Kollock, 1998). in situations characterized by social dilemmas, 
it shouldn’t be presumed that self-interested behaviour will lead to optimal (or 
even satisfactory) collective outcomes. as schelling observers, economic markets, 
when they function properly, are special cases in which “knowledgeable voluntary 
exchange of alienable commodities” driven by self-interest are likely to produce good 
collective results—just as “only some ellipses are circles” (schelling, 1978: 33).
most analyses of social dilemmas assume that individuals exhibit a kind of loose 
utility maximization or a “commonsense notion of purposive action” (coleman, 1990: 
13). There is no significant difference, therefore, between the type of actors assumed 
to populate economic markets and those assumed to confront social dilemmas. 
The difference between the predicted outcomes associated with social dilemmas 
and economic markets lies, instead, in the assumed structure of the interaction 
context. in the case of social dilemmas, behavioural interdependence among 
participants is assumed. in other words, it is assumed that actors are affected and/
or influenced by the behaviour of others actors. in social dilemmas, behavioural 
interdependence often manifests itself as jointness of supply, defined as a decrease 
in average production costs as the number of contributors increases. This means 
that contribution to a public good by one individual changes the incentives faced by 
another individual contemplating a contribution to the same public good.
The literature on social dilemmas makes a distinction between two-person and 
multiple-person dilemmas. categorizing two-person dilemmas by internal incentive 
structure yields five distinct categories: Prisoner’s Delemmas, chicken Games, 
assurance Games, Privileged Games and altruist’s Dilemmas (heckathorn, 1996). 
The nature and dynamics of social dilemmas can be made clearer by providing a 
concrete illustrative example. The most well-known of these different categories 
is the Prisoner’s Dilemma—the “game that launched,” according to Kollock, “a 
thousand studies (actually, several thousand)” (1998: 185).The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 13
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemmas derives its name from the original back story created by 
albert Tucker, a colleague of merrill flood and melvin Dresher, the two scientists 
at ranD corporation in santa monica, california who developed the dilemma in 
1950 and used it in an informal experiment (Kollock, 1998: 185). in the original 
scenario, a law enforcement representative offers two criminals the opportunity 
to provide evidence against each other in exchange for leniency. They are each 
informed that if both choose to provide evidence, then the offer of leniency will 
be retracted and each will receive a relatively long sentence. on the other hand, if 
neither informs on the other, then the official admits that each is likely to receive 
a relatively light sentence. The inducement, explains the official, is that if one 
prisoner provides evidence and the other does not, then the cooperating prisoner 
will be rewarded with a particularly light sentence while the other will be punished 
with a particularly long sentence. in other words, there are four possible outcomes: 
1) both prisoners cooperate, 2) the first prisoner cooperates, but the second prisoner 
does not, 3) the first prisoner refuses to cooperate, but the second prisoner does, and 
4) neither prisoner cooperates. The chart below displays possible payoffs for each 
prisoner for each possible outcome.
figure 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff matrixThe Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 14
Beal, Brent D. (2012) ‘competitive markets, collective action, and the Big Box retailer 
problem’, The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
The best possible outcome for each prisoner is to confess while the other prisoner 
refuses to do so. This outcome can be labelled “cD” (confess, don’t confess). The 
next preferred outcome is for neither prisoner to confess (DD), followed by mutual 
confession (cc), and finally Dc (don’t confess, confess). This preference order 
distinguishes a Prisoner’s Dilemmas from other types of dilemmas. if, for example, 
the payoffs in figure 1 were altered so that each prisoner preferred mutual refusal 
to cooperate over unilateral confession (i.e. if the most preferred and the second 
most preferred outcomes were reversed), then the dilemma would be transformed 
into an assurance Game (heckathorn, 1996).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, as described above and represented in figure 1, has a 
deficient equilibrium, defined as an outcome in which no participant has incentive to 
alter his or her behaviour despite the existence of at least one other outcome in which 
all participants would be better off. The Prisoner’s dilemma is also characterized 
by a dominating strategy, defined as a strategy “that yields the best outcome for an 
individual regardless of what anyone else does” (Kollock, 1998: 185). in figure 2, 
solid arrows represent the choices available to Prisoner 1, while outlined arrows 
represent the choices available to Prisoner 2. as figure 2 illustrates, regardless of 
the behaviour of the other prisoner, each prison is always better off confessing. The 
structure the prisoner’s dilemmas, therefore, creates a context in which rational 
individual-level behaviour leads to a collectively irrational outcome (in this case, a 
combined total of twenty years in prison, the worst possible collective outcome).
figure 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix with decision arrowsThe Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 15
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multiple-person dilemmas
When two-person dilemmas are generalized to multi-person dilemmas, two broad 
categories emerge: social fence dilemmas and social trap dilemmas. in social fence 
dilemmas participants incur immediate costs that generate a public good that is 
shared by everyone. in contrast, in social trap dilemmas individual participants 
extract an immediate private benefit while simultaneously imposing costs on 
everyone else. in the first case, participants have an incentive to attempt to avoid the 
direct cost of participation (i.e. to free ride), while finding a way to take advantage 
of the benefit generated by the participation of others. in the second case, incentives 
are reversed and the best possible outcome is for the individual participant to 
extract immediate private benefit while all other participants refrain from doing 
so. in the case of social fence dilemmas, if all participants attempt to free ride, then 
the ability of the group to realize collective objectives will be undermined, even if 
everyone would have been better off if the group’s efforts had been successful. in the 
case of social traps, if everyone attempts to extract a private benefit, the benefit may 
be outweighed by the costs imposed on each individual by other individuals in the 
group.
utility maximization, social dilemmas and the Big Box retailer problem
specialization, division of labour, mutually-beneficial exchange, coordination, and 
processes related to equilibrium and mutual adjustment are all integral to properly 
functioning markets and require a certain degree of rational and self-interested 
behaviour by market participants (cassidy, 2009; lindblom, 2001; Walters, 1993). 
at minimum, therefore, participants in economic markets are assumed to exhibit a 
“commonsense notion of purposive action” and are generally assumed to be motivated 
by self-interest (coleman, 1990: 13). it is often assumed that if individuals are left 
alone to engage in purposive self-interested behaviour, their efforts, when summed 
or aggregated, will lead to positive collective outcomes. market systems are supposed 
to work the “way ant colonies work” in the sense that in properly functioning 
economic markets unconstrained individual activity should produce positive 
outcomes when aggregated (schelling, 1978: 21-22). as adam smith observed, it is 
as if individual participants in economic markets are led by an “invisible hand” to 
promote the general welfare, even though their only immediate intention may be to 
further their own interests.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 16
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in contrast to how economic markets are expected to function, the Big Box 
retailer—and the preceding discussion of social dilemmas in general—
demonstrates that unguided individual behaviour motivated by self-interest, under 
certain conditions, will produce suboptimal outcomes.
The Big Box retailer Problem outlined above is an example of a social fence 
dilemma and exhibits many of the same characteristics as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Given the relative value the townspeople placed on the town’s plaza, the optimal 
outcome would have been for the townspeople to have continued to patronize the small 
shops in the town’s plaza. instead, the incentive structure of the situation created 
an incentive for individual townspeople to attempt to free ride on the public good 
generated by the buying decisions of other town residents. Because each resident faced 
the same incentive structure and chose the same course of action, the townspeople, 
considered collectively, irrationally elected to shop at the Big Box retailer, thereby 
putting the main street shops out of business. as Kollock observes, in the social 
dilemmas “individual rationality leads to collectively irrationality” (1998).
markets from the inside
The popular notion of economic markets is only loosely connected to the well-
developed theoretical models that formally address systemic outcomes, such as 
productive and allocative efficiency and maximization of social surplus (Bator, 
1957; smith, 1776/1976). Popular perceptions and beliefs about economic markets, 
however, are generally more proximate to individual behaviour, and are often 
more important in determining the nature of collective action (or lack thereof). 
in other words, what market participants observe, and how they make sense of 
their observations, is not only essential to an understanding of individual market 
behaviour, but also to an understanding of the decision to coordinate behaviour 
through market processes rather than through collective action.
The Big Box retailer scenario illustrates why it is often difficult for individual 
actors to assess the efficiency of systemic outcomes based on the observable behaviour 
of other actors. in particular, the Big Box retailer problem illustrates two common, 
but logically suspect, attributions that are often made by market participants based 
observed customer demand. The Big Box retailer scenario also serves to highlight 
the counter-intuitive nature of associated feedback loops that, unless properly 
interpreted, may erroneously be perceived to support market-based approaches to 
collective decision-making (i.e. approaches designed to “let the market decide”).The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 17
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attribution problems
in the Big Box retailer scenario, townspeople were offered a choice—either shop 
at the small downtown shops or patronize the Big Box retailer outlet. an observer 
might assert the following:
By patronizing the Big Box retailer, the townspeople are demonstrating that they 
value the benefits of shopping at the Big Box retailer more than the public goods 
derived from the town’s plaza.
unfortunately, this conclusion fails to take into the account the individual-level 
incentives inherent in this type of social dilemma. in this case, although it may 
be in the interest of individual actors to patronize the Big Box retailer, it may 
not be in the collective interest of the townspeople to do so. in other words, as the 
literature on collective action demonstrates, the notion of revealed preference cannot 
be applied at the group or aggregate level with any degree of confidence (axelrod, 
1984; hardin, 1982; heckathorn, 1996; Kollock, 1998; oliver, 1993; olson, 1965; 
schelling, 1978). in social dilemmas, the aggregate behaviour of the group cannot be 
used to make accurate attributions regarding individual preferences or motives. for 
example, observation of the collective behaviour of two participants in a prisoner’s 
dilemmas might be used to justify the assertion that the participants prefer to be 
incarcerated. Why else would they “choose” to spend the maximum time in jail (see 
figure 2, the bottom-right cell)? in the case of the Big Box retailer, individual 
townspeople are not making a binary value assessment by shopping at the larger 
outlet, they are making a rational calculation within the context of a social fence 
dilemma. Given that best outcome for each individual is to patronize the Big Box 
retail (as long as everyone else continues to patronize the shops in the town’s 
plaza), individual townspeople are reacting to incentives to engage in free-riding 
behaviour. as is the case here, a defining characteristic of social dilemmas is that 
rational behaviour by individual participants leads to irrational group or collective 
outcomes.
again, based on observed behaviour, the following might also be asserted:
The fact that the townspeople continue to patronize the Big Box retailer over time 
is an indication of the efficiency of the outcome, given that if the outcome were 
inefficient, corrective market forces would intervene.
as is the case with the first assertion, this conclusion is premised on inaccurate 
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market outcomes are inherently unstable. in the case of typical market commodities, 
for example, a rise in price generally gives rise to countervailing self-correcting 
behaviour on the part of market participants that will return the market to a 
stable equilibrium (Bator, 1957; Walters, 1993). The self-correcting tendencies of 
the market mechanism, however, are dependent on a number of assumptions, one 
of which is the behavioural independence of market participants. in situations in 
which this assumption is violated—i.e. in the case of social dilemmas—there is no 
assurance that inefficient or deficient outcomes will be checked by corrective forces. 
for example, in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, even though both prisoners may 
acknowledge that the bottom-left cell in figure 2 represent the worst possible joint 
outcome, neither prisoner may be willing to unilaterally alter his or her behaviour 
in order to improve the situation. likewise, in the case of the Big Box retailer 
scenario, there is no incentive for individuals to alter their behaviour, even though 
it may be universally recognized that the collective outcome is deficient. stability of 
a collective outcome, therefore, cannot be confidently interpreted as an indication of 
outcome efficiency.
Deceptive feedback loops
in the Big Box retailer problem, the mayor could have elected to pursue a market-
based “let-the-consumer-choose” approach from the outset. it is interesting to observe 
that feedback from such an approach would likely have been positive. for example, 
such an approach would not have required any upfront costs and no constraints on 
individual behaviour would have been necessary, which would have obviated the 
need to establish any monitoring or compliance mechanisms. The emergent outcome 
would have been viewed as legitimate because it would have been supported by the 
ongoing consumer behaviour of the townspeople. Despite these virtues, however, this 
approach would have produced (and subsequently did produce) a deficient outcome.
in contrast, feedback associated with collective action is likely to be negative for 
several reasons. in the specific case of the Big Box retailer, significant costs were 
incurred in making individual preferences explicit and available to a central 
coordinator. second, a decision to constrain retail activity to the city centre would 
have required monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and would likely have been 
perceived as a constraint on individual behaviour. finally, the outcome would have 
been unstable, given that there would have been ongoing incentives for individuals 
to find a way to enjoy—but to avoid contributing to—the public good generated 
by the confluence of social and economic activity in the town’s plaza. in other The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 19
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words, there would have continued to be individuals that would have advocated 
for alternative retail options. collective action, therefore, in contrast to a market 
approach, is likely to be costly, require enforcement mechanism, and to be the target 
of ongoing efforts to undermine it. Despite these disadvantages, in the case of the 
Big Box retailer problem (and in the case of social dilemmas, in general), collective 
action is the most likely to produce optimal outcomes.
“if the outcome is deficient (or suboptimal),” the argument goes, “why would town 
residents continue to engage in contributory behaviour, thereby ‘choosing’ the 
deficient outcome?” if collective action produces an outcome that is the preferred 
by the town residents, considered collectively, why would residents need continuous 
encouragement (and/or the threat of punishment) to induce them to continue to 
‘choose’ it? The answer to both these question lies in the counter-intuitive nature of 
social dilemmas. The Big Box retailer scenario is designed to illustrate a case in 
which the easy path—the market approach—produces a deficient outcome that can 
be improved through collective action.
application
The attributions referenced above, if generalized, can be observed in a number of 
different market contexts. The controversy over ceo pay in the u.s., for example, 
represents a context in which similar attributions are often made in an attempt 
to justify what appears to be unreasonably high compensation (owen, 2009). in 
the Big Box retailer scenario, it was asserted, by a hypothetical observer, that 
because the townspeople patronized the Big Box retailer, their behaviour revealed 
an individual-level preference for the associated collective outcome. The same 
attributions are often made in the case of ceo pay (i.e. if companies, considered 
collectively, pay ceo large sums of money, it is because individual companies, and 
the individuals that run those companies, prefer to do so). likewise, it was assumed 
by a hypothetical observer that because the townspeople continued, over time, to 
patronize the Big Box retailer, the outcome couldn’t be inefficient, because if it 
were, market forces would intervene. The same argument is often made with respect 
to ceo pay packages: “if the pay packages represent an unreasonable expense on 
the behalf of corporations, the competitive pressures will curtail the practice.” in 
the case of ceo pay, as in the stylized Big Box retailer scenario, both the notion 
that collective behaviour can be used as an indicator of revealed preference and the 
assumption that inefficient (or deficient) market outcomes are unstable support 
problematic attributions regarding the economic efficiency of market outcomes. The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 20
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attempts to address what owen (2009) refers to as the ceo “pay problem” often run 
up against the same types of counter-intuitive feedback loops that make market-
based solutions both the least costly to implement and enforce, despite the fact that 
these solutions fail to address the underlying incentives problems and are likely to 
produce deficient outcomes.
other markets can be identified in which social dilemmas contribute to problematic 
and/or inefficient outcomes and in which actor attributions often complicate 
attempts to address these deficiencies. The u.s. college textbook market, for 
example, has been described as “broken” because “the primary individuals who 
choose college textbooks (faculty) are not the people that pay for those textbooks 
(students)” (Koch, 2006: 1). The separation of the purchase decision and payment 
has contributed to a set of market participant incentives that result in systemic 
dysfunction. one industry insider accused the u.s college textbook of overcharging 
“a captive audience (students) for needlessly thick, poorly edited tomes,” failing 
to adequately compensate academic authors that provide the content for these 
textbooks, and needlessly causing faculty (and students) headaches by releasing new 
editions “filled with unwanted bells and whistles, on a falsely sped-up publication 
cycle” (Weir, 2009). There are significant parallels between the textbook market and 
other markets characterized by a separation of the purchase decision and payment. 
for example, in the u.s. prescription drug market, doctors generally decide which 
drugs to prescribe, but the patient is responsible for payment. another obvious 
example is the u.s. healthcare sector. in each of these cases, individual-level 
incentives lead to interdependent patterns of economic interaction that produce 
suboptimal collective outcomes—and in each case, individual actors often make 
erroneous attributions, based on observed demand and stability, regarding outcome 
efficiency. likewise, feedback loops similar to those identified in the stylized Big 
Box retailer scenario complicate attempts to address these deficiencies.
This approach goes beyond traditional discussions of market failure (see, Bozeman, 
2002; stiglitz, 2000) in two ways. first, this approach focuses on social dilemmas, 
and by association, on behavioural interdependence. This represents a more 
narrow focus than general discussions of market failure related to externalities, 
transactions costs, information problems, monopolies, and other factors (Bozeman, 
2002). second, the primary intent is to understand the attributions often made 
by individual actors in these situations and the often counter-intuitive nature of 
feedback loops that may encourage acceptance of deficient outcomes—outcomes that 
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changing the assumptions
The assumptions of Big Box retailer scenario could easily be altered so that 
restricting economic activity to the town square is not the preferred collective 
outcome. for example, the relative values attached to the enhanced sense of 
community and collective identity, and the cost savings associated with the Big Box 
retailer, respectively, could be reversed. it could also be assumed that the collective 
decision process is inappropriately controlled by residents with a vested interest in 
the preservation of the city center shops. under these conditions, collective action 
might result in the restriction of retail activity to the city center even though the 
townspeople, considered collectively, would benefit from the entry of the Big Box 
retailer.
The point of the Big Box retailer is not to argue that collective action always 
produces superior outcomes—it is only intended to demonstrate that collective 
action can produce superior outcomes. The Big Box retailer scenario is designed 
to demonstrate that the market mechanism is capable of producing stable, but 
inefficient, outcomes that are supported by ongoing individual behaviour. i do not 
assert that the market always produces such outcomes—only that such outcomes 
are likely in contexts characterized by behavioural interdependence. The question 
is how to distinguish between efficient and inefficient market outcomes, or how to 
distinguish between efficient and inefficient outcomes associated with collective 
action. in the case of the Big Box retailer, neither a full parking lot, viewed as 
a proxy for demand, or ongoing contributory behaviour by town residents, should 
be viewed as evidence of the superiority of market outcomes. likewise, neither the 
upfront costs associated with collective action, nor the need for ongoing monitoring 
nor compliance mechanisms should be viewed as indicators that a collective action 
is unwise.
The fat middle
The contrast between markets and collective action is similar to the distinction 
between markets and hierarchy in transaction cost economics (alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1988; hennart, 1993; Williamson, 1985), although there 
are some important differences. it can be argued, for example, that transaction 
cost economics assumes the primacy of economic markets and then proceeds to 
carve out theoretical space for hierarchical relationships by identifying areas 
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economics is a theory of market failure as much as it is a theory of hierarchy or the 
modern “firm” or corporation (Demsetz, 1988; hennart, 1988). in transaction cost 
economics, therefore, corporations are conceptualized as islands in an open ocean 
of market transactions and the challenge is provide a theoretical explanation for 
their existence against the backdrop of an overarching suspicion that these islands 
represent inconvenient imperfections in the seascape.
although similar in certain respects to the ideas espoused in transaction cost 
economics, the arguments here are more aligned with similar arguments in 
economic sociology that view markets as intentional social institutions that depend 
on collective action for definition, structure and maintenance (smelser & swedberg, 
1994). although barter systems, and the human propensity to “truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another”—may be natural phenomena, properly functioning 
economic market are not (smith, 1776/1976: 7). economic markets are complex 
institutions brought about and preserved through collective action. There is a long 
list of public goods that undergird market activity, including personal liberty, 
property rights, social norms governing quid pro quo exchange, the sale of activities 
and performances, and the emergence of intermediaries, entrepreneurs, and 
collectives (lindblom, 2001). another list of structural conditions must be added 
to this list first list, including a relatively large number of independent buyers and 
sellers, the absence of pricing power, product homogeneity, the absence of entry or 
exit barriers, the absence of artificial price constraints, and the presence of complete 
and costless information (Bator, 1957; Walters, 1993). These public goods and 
structural conditions can be conceptualized as the stage upon which economic actors 
enact economic markets. absent these public goods or structural requisites, which 
must be produced through collective action—markets are unlikely to yield positive 
outcomes.
This view suggests that efficient economic markets should be conceptualized as a 
special case of social coordination achieved through “mutual adjustment rather than 
by a central coordinator” (lindblom, 2001). it is important to recognize both the 
virtues and limits of economic markets, given that not all markets will yield positive 
outcomes. This notion is captured succinctly in schelling’s assertion that “only 
some ellipses are circles” (schelling, 1978: 33). This argument runs parallel in some 
respects to hennart’s position that most economic transactions occur in the “swollen 
middle” and are a mix of market and hierarchy (cassidy, 2009; hennart, 1993).
The inseparability of market activity and collective action becomes apparent 
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advocates social dilemmas is to attempt to find a “market” solution—i.e. a solution 
that emerges in an unguided or unplanned fashion from self-interested individual 
interaction. for example, if the initial assumptions of the prisoner’s dilemmas 
were altered to allow for repetition of the same scenario with the same participants, 
then the repeated interaction might foster cooperation and better outcomes might 
be realized. in some circumstances, the possibility of facing the same individual 
in a similar situation at some point in the future might be sufficient to induce 
cooperation. regardless of the specifics of particular solutions, the hope is that 
solutions would arise spontaneously from individual interaction. if such solutions 
were common, then social dilemmas would not represent a significant threat to the 
ability of market processes to produce optimal collective outcomes, given that self-
interested individuals, when confronted by social dilemmas, would simply negotiate 
mutually-beneficial cooperative workarounds that would allow optimal outcomes to 
be realized. in this scenario, social dilemmas could be conceptualized as stones in 
a streambed—obstacles that that the larger current of market transactions would 
adjust to or flow around.
There is an active and extension literature on solutions to social dilemmas (Kollock, 
1998). many of these solutions rely on repeated interaction, the presence of trust, the 
ability to publicly commit to particular courses of action, the emergence of norms 
(and associated sanctions), or other mechanisms that serve to change the dilemmas 
dynamics. axelrod explores “tit-for-tat” and other cooperative solutions to these 
kinds of dilemmas in an influential book entitled “The evolution of cooperation” 
(1984). Kollock (1998) groups solutions into three categories: motivational, 
strategic and structural. The prisoner’s dilemmas outlined above is only one of five 
different dilemmas identified by heckathorn (1996) in his theoretically exhaustive 
inventory—each with its own incentive structure and internal dynamics.
The idea of market-like (i.e. emergence, unplanned, and spontaneous) solutions 
to social dilemmas is problematic for several reasons. first, some types of social 
dilemmas are more difficult to resolve than others. social dilemmas that are 
characterized by a dominating strategy are particularly difficult to resolve. second, 
solutions to social dilemmas generally involve either expanding the concept of 
self-interest to include, for example, consideration of social value orientations (e.g. 
mcclintock & liebrand, 1988) or group identity (e.g. Kramer & Brewer, 1984), or 
working together with other participants to monitor behaviour, provide selective 
incentives, set up sanctioning systems, or establishing an external authority 
(Komorita, 1987; olson, 1965; ostrom, 1990; rutte & Wilke, 1985; Yamagishi, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 24
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1986). in most cases, these types of solutions require effort, planning, organization 
and resources, and therefore do not conform to the generally-excepted notion of 
unguided or spontaneous ordering generally associated with efficient markets. 
many of these solutions are more accurately categorized as examples of collective 
action—regardless of whether or not market participants find solutions to these 
social dilemmas themselves or if solutions are implemented by third parties. in 
other words, collective action is required to resolve these types of dilemmas so that 
markets can function—and these efforts are more accurately conceptualized as part 
of the stage upon which markets are enacted than part of the market system itself.
conclusion
The primary purpose of this article is to demonstrate that faith in the ability of 
economic markets to produce optimal outcomes is, under certain circumstances, 
misplaced. in exchange situations characterized by behavioural interdependence, 
as demonstrated in the Big Box retailer scenario, social dilemmas arise that can 
lead to suboptimal outcomes that are stable and supported by ongoing exchange 
activity. unfortunately, stability and ongoing contributory behaviour are often 
inappropriately employed as indicators of market efficiency.
social dilemmas represent fertile ground for future theorizing. a number of 
important questions—questions that deserve much more lengthy and careful 
treatment than can be afforded here—have yet to be mentioned. for example, how 
much value do market participants place on the absence of a central coordinator? 
in other words, how much value do market participants place on the characteristics 
of the market mechanism independent of the merits of specific market outcomes? 
This question addresses the link that is often made between economic markets 
and individual freedom (friedman, 1962; lindblom, 2001). collective action 
often requires coercion in some form to prevent free-riding and other individual 
behaviour that may run counter to the realization of group objectives. in other 
words, there may be cases in which collective action would yield significantly better 
collective outcomes, but participants may prefer suboptimal market outcomes once 
the value of the absence of coercive structural elements inherent in collective action 
are taken into account. another question concerns the degree to which business 
educators are responsible for teaching the virtues and limits of economic markets? 
This question is particular relevant in the ongoing debate regarding the role of 
business school curriculum and ethics education in recent corporate scandals (alsop, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 25
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2003; crane & matten, 2004; Ghosal, 2003; Pfeffer & fong, 2004). other questions 
arise in the context of the intersection of corporate strategy and corporate social 
responsibility (see, for example, Porter & Kramer, 2011). for example, how should 
business behave in situations in which promotion of the market mechanism is in the 
interest of the firm, but not necessarily in the best interest of the community and/or 
society? should firms seek to extend market activity beyond the domain in which it 
is likely to yield optimal outcomes? What are the risks, if any, of doing so?
a clear-eyed analysis of the Big Box retailer Problem has the potential to 
simultaneously contribute to our understanding of economic markets and increase 
our respect for the potential value and efficiency of collective action. Discussion of 
the respective roles of economic markets and collective action may also contribute in 
significant ways to larger philosophical issues related to the proper role of business 
in society.
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